These perspectives depend on several theoretical frameworks to investigate cognition in animals is in terms of mentalistic notions. One such framework for perceptual consciousness is that of the intentional stance, which assumes that each individual is an intentional system capable of mental states like beliefs, desires and emotions. Several levels of intentionality can then be discerned, ranging from the zero level, where behaviours are entirely non-mentalistic—either simple reflex actions or learned responses—to the third level, seen in humans, where individuals have beliefs about beliefs, whether of themselves or of others. Another important functional framework encompasses attribution, whereby an individual is capable of attributing thoughts, emotions and desires to another individual. To attribute such mental states to both oneself and to others, then, is to have what has been termed a theory of mind. Social animals, in particular, appear to be knowledgeable about one another’s behaviour to different extents. But do they know as much about each other’s beliefs and intentions? Are they adept at recognising the similarities and differences between their own and others’ states of mind? Behavioural decision-making processes need to be analysed carefully in order to ascertain whether true higher-order intentionality can indeed be invoked as underlying mechanisms governing such behavioural acts. An alternative, more functional, perspective of nonhuman cognition, which must be briefly mentioned here, is that of distributed cognition, which disregards the ability of an individual to have observationally invisible mental states and only recognises communicative interactions and the behavioural dynamics within the entire group as manifestation of the socio-cognitive complexity that individuals are capable of displaying. To return to mentalism, the principal advantage that an animal enjoys if it is able to recognise that other individuals have beliefs, which might be different from its own, is that it becomes capable of immensely more flexible and adaptive behaviour. It might then be able to manipulate another individual’s actions and beliefs in a great variety of social situations.